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SYSTEM SUPPORT POLITICS AND THE
CONGRESSIONAL COURT OF APPEALS
ALBERT P.

MELONE*

Constitutional historians will surely characterize the Warren
Era as one in which the Supreme Court was subjected to severe attack. Court decisions concerning such matters as segregation, internal security, school prayer and criminal justice precipitated hostile reaction from a variety of groups. Public opinion studies indicated substantial citizen dissatisfaction with the Warren Court.' At
least two modern Presidents, Eisenhower and Nixon, reacted to several landmark decisions with something less than enthusiastic support. A study on the relationship between Congress and the Court
concluded that the widely held academic belief that 2 Congress
treats the Court with great reverence is far from true.
While analysis of legislative roIl-call votes has proven to be a
useful tool, a more complete appraisal of Court-Congress relations
entails an understanding of the subtle influences of the legal profession within the legislative system. The study of interest groups, particularly the American Bar Association, can be instructive as to the
dynamics of inter-institutional conflict within the general framework of systems analysis.
I. LAWYERS, CONGRESS AND SUPPORT
Lawyers are among a relatively small group who are strategically located in the social structure to promote elite support and
public respect for the Supreme Court. By virtue of its great social
prestige and unusual access to centers of governmental power, a
well organized bar association may inhibit and combart attacks upon
the judicial system. Bar organizations and ethical codes admonish
lawyers to promote favorable public images toward the judiciary.'
Indeed, most lawyers studied in one midwestern state believe it is
* Asst. Prof. & Chairman, Dept. of Political Science, North Dakota
Ph.D.. 1972, University of Iowa.
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1. Beiser, Lawyers Judge the Warren Court, 7 L. & Soc'y REv. 139 (1972) ; IMurphy &
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their professional responsibility to promote positive public attitudes
toward the judiciary.4
While lawyers may feel a professional responsibility to aid in
the promotion of public respect for courts, the available evidence suggests that specific disapproval of Warren Court decisions has made
explicit general support difficult to articulate. A bare majority of
Rhode Island attorneys favorably assessed the Warren Court-' Studies indicate that in terms of roll-call behavior, lawyer-legislators
are no more supportive of the Supreme Court than non-lawyer legislators.6 Asking their attitude toward the Supreme Court in business and civil liberty matters, Alan F. Westin wrote in 1960 to thirtyfive general counsels of the top one hundred industrial, merchandising, financial, utility and transportation enterprises. He reports that
twenty-five responded and "their answers were overwhelmingly
hostile and angry about the Court on both matters."" It should be emphasized that attorneys, as is the case for the lay public, may maintain general support for the legal system yet at the same time exhibit low specific support for certain Court decisions: both attitudes
are not mutually exclusive.
Yet public speech is not the only way lawyers may promote public respect for and induce elite support of the judicial system. The
"Congressional Court of Appeals" provides an important forum in
which the organized bar may exert its influence.s Supreme Court
rulings involving statutory and constitutional interpretations have
sometimes precipitated hostile and retaliatory Congressional reaction. Legislation is introduced and passed which seeks to nullify a
Court decision by rewriting a statute, removing appellate jurisdiction or changing the Constitution itself. Probably the most often
used and certainly the least visible technique is statutory revision.
The alteration of the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act section concerning the word "work" is probably the most celebrated example.9
Yet there are cases, and no one really knows how many, where organized interest groups turn to the Congress, the "super-court", for relief from a Supreme Court decision with little if any notoriety. For
4. Wagner, Avenues of Legal Profession Influnce on Public Attitudes Toward Courts,
(paper presented at the meeting of the Western Political Science Association, 1973) 1-2.
5. Beiser, supra note 1, at 139.

6. Brady, Schmidhauser & Berg, House Lawyers and Support for the
Supreme Court,
35 J. Po,. 724 (1973) ; Green, Schmidhauser & Berg, Variations in Congressional
Responses

to the Warren and Burger Courts, (paper presented at the meetings of the Western
Political Science Association, 1974) 4, 11, 12, 16; Green, Schmidhauser, Berg
& Brady, Lawyers in Congress: A New Look at Some Old Assumptions, 26 WEST.
POL. Q. 440 (1973)

Schmidhauser, Berg & Melone, supra note 2, at 238.
7. Westin, Corporate Appeals to Congress for Relief from Supreme Court Rulings
(paper
presented at the meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1962) 10.
8. Apparently it was Alan F. Westin who coined the phrases "Congressional Court
of
Appeals" and the "Super Court." See Westin, stupra note 7. For an elaboration
on Westin
see J. ScssMmHAusER & L. BERG, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONGRESS 140-41 (1972).
9. For an excellent case study, see: R. Morgan, The Portal-to-PortalPay Case,
60-82
(Pritchet & Westin ed. 1963).
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example, the 89th Congress, importuned by big business groups
and the American Bar Association, passed H.R. 11256, a bill relating
to the priority of federal tax liens and levies. This bill, later to become
Public Law 89-719, overruled two Supreme Court decisions and
passed both the House and the Senate without a roll call division. o
While more is known about the removal of appellate jurisdiction
and constitutional amendments, little information is available on
the role of interest groups as a sub-system in "Congressional Court of
Appeals" activities. Even less is known about the one organized interest group which is ideally suited to aid the Court in its legislative
struggles. The American Bar Association, with its favorable public and congressional reputation for neutrality and objectivity, its unusual access and its great influence, is ideally situated to applaud
or condemn the Court.11
Scholars have attempted to classify types of anticourt legislation and while these classifications are useful the various typologies
do not satisfy the needs of systems analysis with respect to interest group studies.1 2 For our purposes, all attempts to alter negatively
a Court ruling, Court structure or jurisdiction are deemed Courtcurbing devices. Not all Court-curbing devices, however, have systemic ramifications. Congress may clarify its intent by rewriting a
statute without removing authority from the Court to hear such cases.
A constitutional amendment may overrule a decision without casting aspersions on the wisdom or integrity of the Court. In short, the
Court's authority may remain intact while at the same time reversing decisions perceived to be deliterious. Such attempts are termed
specific support controversies. Institutional support controversies,
on the other hand, entail attempts to limit the jurisdiction or diminish
the Court's authority to settle cases or controversies under Article III
of the Constitution. Institutional support controversies have systemic ramifications because they fundamentally involve issues of
boundary definition. While the Constitution provides for some boundary flexibility, each branch of government is assured of authority
within its respective realms. Our classification, however, is complicated by the Article III grant to Congress to regulate the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Yet to remove what it has
given is to alter a once established and enlarged boundary. The re10.
11.

Schmidhauser, Berg & Melone, supra note 2, at 214.
While the A.B.A. has the reputation for objectivity and neutrality the facts are

otherwise.

See

Melone,

Agency

Politics: The

American Bar Association, Business and

Public Policy (paper presented at the meetings of the Western Political Science Association, San Diego, Calif., 1973).
12. See, e.g., J. SCHMIDHAUSER & L. BERG, supra note 8, at 144-46; Nagel, Court-Curbing Periods in American History, 18 VAND. L. REV. 925, 926-27 (1965) ; Ratner, Congr6ssional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PENN. L.
Rnv. 157, 158 (1960); Stumpf, Congressional Response to Supreme Court Rulings: The

Interaction of Law and Politics, 14 J. Pus. L. 877, 382 (1965).
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moval of appellate jurisdiction may be an acceptable constitulonal
practice, but it can create equilibrium problems for the judicial system. Without institutional support, the Court's relative independence is subject to serious impairment, thereby affecting predictable
expectations so necessary for the maintenance of the judicial system.
Moreover, it is clear that the use of support controversies entails a systems model. This model permits conflict within stipulated
definitions of equilibrium. If an interest group is concerned with
preserving the system, and the legal profession most certainly is, it
can still fail to offer the Court specific support in particular CourtCongress altercations. But if disagreements with the Court result in
removal of institutional support then system maintenance becomes a serious issue. Fear of the latter result is summed up by
Attorney General Rogers in a letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee considering legislation designed to limit the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. He wrote:
This type of legislation threatens the independence of the
judiciary. The natural consequences of such enactment is
that the courts would operate under the constant apprehension that if they rendered unpopular decisions, jurisdiction
would be further curtailed. Indeed, if the principle of this
legislation should be approved, similar punitive enactments
might be threatened against other Federal Courts."3
II. ABA SUPPORT FOR THE COURT
As the ostensible representative of the legal profession, the
American Bar Association has the professional duty to support the
legal system generally. But this task is complicated by cross-pressures emitting from, at least in part, the attorney-client relationship. Many ABA, leaders have for clients some of the nation's wealthiest business enterprises and tend to come from the upper reaches
of the stratified bar. 14 This evidence is supplemented by the knowledge that the ABA shares many public policy goals and even takes
part in their formulation with the representatives of big business. 1
As already noted, many Warren Court decisions, particularly those
concerning civil liberties, were greeted in some quarters, including
business, with regret and hostility. The point being that in the face
of clientele interests and general ideological proclivities the Association's professional responsibility to support the Court was difficult to meet. The attempt to reconcile general institutional support
with specific disapproval of certain Court decisions engendered a
13. Hearings on S. 2646 Before the Subcomm. to Investigate the Internal Security Act
and Other Internal Security Laws of Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.,
Pt. 2, at 573-74 (1958).
14. A. Melone, Lawyers and the Republic: The American Bar Association and Publo
Policy 39-106 (1972) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Iowa).
15. Id.

CONGRESSIONAL COURT OF APPEALS

most interesting modus operandi.
Representing a high point in post-war ABA-Court relations, the
ABA drafted in 1954 a proposed constitutional amendment which
would have frozen the number of Supreme Court justices at nine, provided for mandatory retirement at age seventy-five and Congress
would relinquish its control over the Court's appellate jurisdiction
in cases involving matters of constitutional law. 16 This proposal
passed in the Senate but died in the House. Walter F. Murphy attributes the Senate's willingness to give up its traditional political weapons against the Court as an expression of its approval of the Vinson
Court's affirmation of congressional authority in internal security
measures, and to the Court's denial of presidential authority in the
Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer" steel seizure case.1
The schiool desegregation case, Brown v. Board of Educacation, 9 and the federal pre-emptive case, Pennsylvania v. Nelson,2 0 infuriated the segregationists and many ultra-security conscious Congressmen. 2 1 The Brown decision ended de jure segregation in public education with Warren's judicial pronouncement
that separate but equal facilities are inherently unequal. The Nelson
decision struck down concurrent state anti-sedition acts. The Court
ruled that the federal government had implicitly pre-empted the sedition field with its many laws and that therefore the state laws
could not be constitutionally enforced.22 The Southern segregationists and those Northern Congressmen interested in internal security
found a way to vent their Court induced anger with the introduction in 1955 of H.R. 3, "A Bill to Establish Rules of Interpretation
Governing Questions of the Effect of Acts of Congress on State
Laws." H.R. 3 sought to permit concurrent state jurisdiction with
the federal government and thereby to effectively overrule the Nelson decision.
This bill provided in part:
That no Act of Congress shall be construed as indicating an
intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in which
such Act operates, to the exclusion of any State laws on the
such Act contains an express
same subject matter, unless
28
provision to that effect.
What H. R. 3 sought, therefore, was a modification of the implied preemption doctrine so as to permit concurrent federal-state jurisdic16. Hearings on S.J. Res. 44 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. at 28-31 (1954).
17. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
18.

W.

MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT

76-78 (1962).

19. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
20. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
21. Murphy, supra note 18, at 86-91.
22. 350 U.S. at 504-05. This is the doctrine of federal supremacy.
23. Hearings on H.R. 3, H.R. 10335, H.R. 10334, Before Subeomm. No. 1 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 9, pt. 2 at 97-98 (1956).
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tion unless Congress provides otherwise.
As Professor Murphy vividly illustrates, the attack upon the
Court was quite severe. 24 Yet H.R. 3 was not an institutional attack
upon the Court. The bill sought to clarify legislative intent by overturning the implied pre-emption rule. It did not limit the Court's
ability to hear and dispose of cases involving federal supremacy;
it attempted to specify congressional intent.
The ABA supported passage of H.R. 3.25 Yet, interestingly,
the ABA's justification was not limited to the field of state sedition
laws. The ABA standing committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform argued that concurrent state laws in the field of commerce,
labor, banking, and communication are subject to federal pre-emption under the Nelson doctrine. 26 It is little wonder that various
big business organizations appeared to testify on behalf of H.R. 3
and labor groups appeared in opposition to passage. 27 While the ABA
maintained that the legislation would eliminate uncertainties in the
law, it must have been known that state legislatures tend to be
stronger defenders of business than the modern Supreme Court.28
Perhaps the strongest attack on the Supreme Court in the postwar era was the introduction of the Jenner Bill in 1957. Senator William E. Jenner of Indiana, with the assistance of the staff of the Senate Internal Security subcommittee, drafted S. 2646, which would have
removed appellate jurisdiction from the Supreme Court in five
classes of cases. They were: contempt of Congress; Federal LoyaltySecurity Program; state anti-subversive statutes; regulation of employment and subversive activities in schools; and admission to the
practice of law in any state.2 9 These five legislative classes were included in the bill as a direct response to Supreme Court decisions.3 0
The ABA's testimony on the Jenner bill reveals its general legislative strategy in Court related matters. It reserved the right to
24.

Murphy, supra note 18, at 86-92.

25. 80 A.B.A. REP. 145 (1955).
26. Id. at 255-60.

27. Interest group alignment on H.R. 3, "to establish rules of interpretation governing
questions of the effect of acts of Congress on state laws." Hearings on H.R. 3 Before a
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
Against
For
Passage
Passage
American Bar Association
X
American Farm Bureau Federlation
X
Missouri State Chamber of Commerce
X
National Association of Attorneys General
X
National Association of Manufacturers
X
National Lumber Manufacturers Association
X
AFL-CIO

X

National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People
X
Railway Labor Executives
X
United States Justice Department
X
28. 80 A.B.A. REP. 255-60.
29. Murphy, supra note 18, at 155-56 (1955).
80. The Supreme Court in Watkins v. United States, 354 IU.S. 178 (1957)

overruled a
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disagree with any decision of the Supreme Court, but strongly opposed the removal of appellate jurisdiction. It argued that the bill
was "contrary to the maintenance of the balance of powers set up
in the Constitution between the executive, legislative and judicial
branches of government." 3' 1 Its position on the bill placed the ABA
in disagreement with groups which strongly disapproved of various Supreme Court decisions.
TABLE 1
INTEREST GROUP ALIGNMENT ON S. 2646, "LIMITATION,
' 82
APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF U.S. SUPREME COURT
Against
For
Passage Passage
X
AFL-CIO
X
American Bar Association
X
American Civil Liberties Union
X
Americans for Democratic Action
X
Emergency Civil Liberties Committee
National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People
Religious Freedom Committee, Inc.
Republican Administration
Workers Defense League
Abe Lincoln National Republican Club
American Coalition of Patriotic Societies, Inc.
Anti-Communist League of America
Congress of Freedom, Inc.
Constitution Party of Virginia
Defenders of American Constitution
Federation for Constitutional Government
Ladies of the GAR
National Review
States Rights Party of Louisiana
Veterans of Foreign Wars
Women's Patriotic Conference
contempt of Congress conviction by sustaining Watkins' contention that a Congressional
Investigation of Communist infiltration into labor unions overstepped Its legitimate legislative authorty. This decision accounts for Jenner's first class of cases to be removed from
the Courts' appellate jurisdiction. The case of Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957)
reversed the "Smith Act" convictions of several Communist leaders and precipitated the
second class of cases to be removed from the Courts' jurisdiction-the federal loyaltysecurity program. The Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956), decision has already
been mentioned as one which caused Congressional concern. Jenner's bill went beyond
H.R. 3 by proposing to remove altogether appellate jurisdiction in all state anti-subversion
statutes and regulation of employment cases. In Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234
(1957) the Court held that a New Hampshire Attorney General could not compel a university professor to answer a number of questions concerning his political beliefs. To counter this decision Jenner proposed his fourth limitation-the removal of jurisdiction from
the Court in school subversive activities cases. Jenner's final proposal was the removal of
Court jurisdiction in cases involving bar admission. The Supreme Court in two cases,
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957), and Konignsberg v. State Bar,
353 U.S. 252 (1957), overruled the respective state bar admission examiners for denying
due process by their refusal to admit the petitioners to the practice of law because of past
membership in the Communist Party.
31. Hearings on S. 2646 Before Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d, Sess.
(1958).
32. Hearing on 8. 2646 Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th
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What has emerged is a legislative strategy in which the ABA
may dissent from specific decisions and yet maintain general institutional support for the Supreme Court. It does not wish to attack
the Supreme Court as an institution by such a direct means as the
removal of appellate jurisdiction. Yet, quite legitimately and consistent with its professional duty, the Association has been willing to
recommend overturning decisions deemed to be undesirable by the
device of specific legislation, as was the case with H.R. 3. This
ABA strategy is perfected in the testimony of ABA President, Ross
L. Malone. Malone's 1959 testimony concerned a number of proposed
anti-subversion bills designed to circumvent various Supreme Court
decisions. He first states clearly that the ABA opposes any limitation
upon the appellate jurisdiction of the Court. But then he recommends
to the Congress that "whenever there are grounds to believe that
weaknesses in internal security have been disclosed as a result
of Court decisions, remedial legislation should be enacted by the
Congress." 3 Malone then proceeds to recommend statutory reversals of the landmark Supreme Court decisions in 3 4 Watkins v. United
States,3 5 Yates v. United States,36 Bonetti v. Rodgers, 7 United
States v. Witkovick s and Pennsylvania v. Nelson.89
A constitutional amendment is another device for overturning
a Supreme Court decision. The eleventh amendment is the classic40
example of an attempt to restrict the Court's appellate jurisdiction.
But not all proposed constitutional amendments are as direct nor
is it always necessary to launch institutional attacks to accomplish
the desired result. The ABA's position on the Bricker and reapportionment amendments are good examples.
Essentially an executive-curbing proposal, the Bricker amendment was also an attempt to limit the implications of several Court
decisions. In 1953 Senator Bricker of Ohio and 63 co-sponsors (45
41
Republicans, 19 Democrats) introduced S.J. Res. 1. This proposed

Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). Table 1 reveals that the A.B.A. found itself in agreement with
left wing and in opposition to right wing citizen groups.
33. Hearings on S. 3, S. 294, S. 527, S. 1299, S. 1300, S. 1301, S. 1302, S. 1303, S. 1301,
S. 1305, S. 1646, H.R. 1992, H.R. 2369, Before Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1959).
34. Id.
35. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
36. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
37. 356 U.S. 691 (1958). The Bonetti decision overturned a deportation proceeding relating to aliens who became members of the Communist Party.
38. 353 U.S. 194 (1957). The Witkovick decision overturned, an interpretation of immigration and nationality act which required the appellee to answer questions concerning his
relationship with the Communist Party.
39. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
40. The Supreme Court in the case of Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793),
accepted jurisdition of a suit against a state by a citizen of another state. This decision
provoked angry reactions by proponents of states' rights and the Congress moved quickly
to limit the Courts' jurisdiction. E. CoRwiN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS
TODAY 875 (13th rev. ed. 1973).
41. CONG.. Q. SERV., CONGRESS AND THE NATION 1945-1964, at 110 (1965).

CONGRESSIONAL COURT OF APPEALS

constitutional amendment sought a limitation of presidential treatymaking and international agreement authority and sought to curb
what was viewed by some as the dangerous dictum in Missouri v.
4 2
Holland.
If this proposed amendment had become part of the Constitution,
needless to say, presidential authority in the field of foreign affairs
would have become severely limited. Former ABA president Frank
E. Holman, speaking for himself but expressing the view of many
of the proponents of the Bricker amendment, believed that:
some 200 treaties proposed or in preparation by the United
Nations covering a wide range of political, social and economic matters
contained provisions at variance with federal
4
or state law.
He also said that the United Nations Charter is a very dangerous
treaty in that the vast array of proposed agreements posed a future
threat when, "a sufficiently internationally and socialistically minded President and Senate will be ready to sponsor and ratify" them."
The official ABA position revealed concern over the implications
of several Supreme Court decisions. Presumably passage of the
Bricker amendment would clarify the proper role of the President
and of Congress in foreign affairs. George A. Finch, testifying before
the Senate Judiciary Committee, stated the official ABA position:
The adoption of the proposed amendment would remove
the doubt expressed by Mr. Justice Holmes in Missouri v.
Holland that treaties must be made in pursuance of the Constitution, because Article VI now reads that treaties need
only be made under the authority of the United States, which
may mean no more than "the formal acts prescribed to make
the convention." Namely, that if we conclude any treaty on
any subject, and the Senate agrees to it by a two-thirds
vote, then that is a treaty under the authority of the United
States without reference to any other provisions of the Constitution. That is what Mr. Justice Holmes means, and it
cannot mean anything else.
The proposed amendment will prevent further development of the dicta of Mr. Justice Sutherland in the CurtissWright case (1936, 299 U.S. 304) that the treaty power does
not rest in grant in the Constitution-we take it another
step-but is inherent in the sovereignty of the Nation, a view
42. 252 U.S. 416 (1920). The Bricker amendment contained, four basic proposals: (1) A
provision of a treaty which denies or abridges any right enumerated in the constitution
would have no force Or effect; (2) No treaty would be construed so as to permit any
foreign power or international organization to supervise, control or adjudicate rights of
citizens of the United States; (3) A treaty could become effective as internal law in the
United States only after enactment of appropriate Congressional legislation; and (4) All
executive agreements between the President and any international organization, foreign
power or official would be subject to limitations imposed on the treaty-making power.
CONG. Q. SEa.V., supra note 41, at 110.
43. CONG. Q. Szav., supra note 41, at 111.
44. Id.
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which found support in the minority opinions of the Supreme
Court in the recent steel-seizure case (Youngstown Co. v.
Sawyer (1952, 343 U.S. 579)).45
Another, and perhaps a less high-minded explanation for the ABA's
policy position on the Bricker amendment might be found in the
statement provided by the United States Chamber of Commerce.
The Chamber's position is cited because both the ABA and the
Chamber have participated in low profile big business summit conferences which have discussed, as part of their proceedings, legislative proposals favorable to big business. 46 Moreover, between 1953
and 1968 the ABA and the Chamber made joint appearances before
congressional committees on at least twenty-six different occasions
and agreed seventy-seven per cent of the time.4 7 Interestingly, the
Chamber's representative before Congress is none other than the
ABA's own, Charles S. Rhyne. Rhyne was a member of the ABA's
House of Delegates from 1944-1954, a chairman of various ABA
committees," and later president of the organization during the
1957-1958 term.4 9 Rhyne, testifying on behalf of the Chamber said:
Businessmen of the Nation are greatly concerned at the flood
of agreements vitally affecting domestic rights and property
which is pouring out of the United Nations and its specialized agencies in an ever-increasing stream. They know it is
virtually impossible to cover all of the hundreds of conferences held each year all over the world and there to effectively protect their interests. They believe that the best answer to these problems is in adoption of a constitutional amendment which prevents treaties from overriding the Constitution and which provides that treaties will not become
domestic law-to either create or destroy rights and property interests-until and unless and only to the extent that the
Congress incorporates them into domestic law. The policy
here recommended will leave the treaty making power in full
force and effect as to all matters genuinely within the sphere
of international agreements. This policy will not affect the
United Nations collective-security efforts which everyone applauds. But it will stop the unwitting, or intentional change
or destruction of domestic rights in the great outpouring of
new proposed treaties, by virtue of our Constitution's "supremacy" clause. A constitutional amendment will achieve
an immediately effective result by ending all the uncertainties in this field created by differing views, unclear court
decisions, and absence of authoritative court decisions on important questions. Only in this way will our system of free
enterprise, the keystone which makes ours the greatest na45. Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 and S.J. Res. 43, Before a Subcomm. of the Senat6 Comm.
on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
46. D. HALL, COOPERATIVE LOBBYING: THE POWER Or PRESSURE 32-34, 88-212 (1969).
47. A. Melone, supra note 14 at 313.
48. Hearings, supra note 45, at 571.
49. 83 A.B.A. REP. 1 (1958).
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tion on earth, be adequately protected in a world where
peace or war depends upon our system keeping us the strongest nation on earth.5 0
I suspect that most view the Bricker amendment solely in
terms of an attempt to limit executive powers. As we have seen
however, it also had at least an ancillary potential benefit for
business interests. The ABA's rather esoteric constitutional argument and the Chamber's clearly stated business enterprise argument combine to produce, at the very least, a partial explanation for why some interest groups sought the adoption of the Bricker amendment. The ABA's nervous reading of various Supreme
Court decisions expresses the fear that international treaties and
agreements may operate as internal law to the detriment of existing domestic law. The Chamber takes the ABA argument to a lower
level of abstraction by stating that some international treaties and
agreements may abrogate domestic rights and property. Through
the medium of an executive-curbing amendment, the ABA hoped to
correct what it believed to be the "dangerous dicta" of several
Court decisions. The Court's power to interpret the Constitution was
not assaulted; yet a remedy consistent with the bar's duty to support
the judiciary was offered.
Another example of specific disapproval while rendering institutional support for the system is the Association's position on a constitutional amendment which would have reversed the Court's decision in Reynolds v. Sims.51
The 1962 Supreme Court decision of Baker v. Carr 2 held that
the denial of equal protection due to malapportionment of state
legislative districts presents a justiciable constitutional cause of action upon which the appellants were entitled to a trial and a decision. A series of implementation decisions followed, of which the
1964 case of Reynolds v. Sims" was probably the most controversial.
This decision held that both houses of a state legislature must be
apportioned according to population.5 4 In 1965 the ABA endorsed
and supported a proposed constitutional amendment, S.J. Res. 2,
to the effect that one house of a bicameral legislature might be apportioned according to factors other than population. 55 These factors could include geography, county and city lines, economic conditions and history.
50. Hearings, supra note 45, at 590.
51. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
52. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 227 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
53. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
54. Id. at 576.
55. Hearings on S.J. Res. 2, 37, 38, 44, Before the Subcomm. on Const. Amend. of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., at 357 (1965) [hereinafter Const.
Hearings].
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From one perspective the ABA recommendation may be viewed
as an attack upon the Supreme Court. The Court made a decision
and the ABA sought to reverse it. From an economic and ideological perspective, it is not difficult, at least in part, to ascertain ABA
motives. As would be expected various farm groups opposed the Reynolds decision for it was believed that a precipitous change in
the rural dominance of state legislatures would occur.5 6 Interestingly enough, big business was also present in the fight for the
amendment. It is probable that rural dominated legislatures are
more likely to oppose taxation and labor proposals detrimental
to business interests. Once again the ABA supported a Court-curbing proposal which also benefited business.
While its position on the reapportionment issue may be construed as an attack upon the Court, the ABA exercised great restraint
in its approach to the problem. In 1963 the influential Council of
State Governments proposed a constitutional amendment to remove apportionment controversies from the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The ABA standing committee on Jurisprudence and
Law Reform endorsed the Council's proposal and asked the Association's House of Delegates in its 1963 Annual meeting to approve the
recommendation. The House of Delegates not only failed to accept
disapprove and
the Committee's recommendation but also voted to
57
oppose the Council of State Governments' proposal.
The argument in favor of the Council's proposal was summed
up by Louis C. Wyman, Chairman of the ABA Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform. He said that the
effect of Baker was to give nine men the authority to run
the legislatures of the 50 states . . . and the Committee be
lieves there are some powers that the states have reserved to
them under the Tenth Amendment . . . for citizens who
believe they do not have the proper representation in their
own legislatures the proper place to go is to their state supreme courts. 58
He also argued that the committee's resolution would tend to draw
a line which needs to be drawn against an all-powerful, all-pervasive centralized national government.5 9 But those voices expressing interest in supporting the Court won the day; a view succinctly
presented by Philadelphia attorney David Berger. He opposed the
Council of State Governments' proposal
because the question now is the independence of the federal
judiciary. Mr. Berger stressed that to say an issue which is
56. Actually the impact of reapportionment was overestimated at the time. See, e.g.,
Brady & Edmonds, One Man, One Vote-So What? TRANs-AcTIoN 41-46, March, 1967.
57. 88 A.B.A. REP. 419-18 (1963).
58. Id. at 417.
59. Id. at 416.
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essentially a constitutional question is beyond the jurisdiction
of the federal courts
and the highest court of our land is a
60
sheer anomaly.
By 1965 dissatisfaction with the development of the doctrine in
Baker moved the ABA to support S.J. Res. 2. Yet its tactic was consistent with the general strategy of rendering the Court general institutional support. Representing the Association before Congress, Earl
F. Morris carefully avoided a direct attack upon the Court. At one
point Mr. Morris emphasized the desire not to attack the Court
by stating that the ABA has chosen to argue its case "not from the
vantage point of whether the Supreme Court was right or wrong in its
application of the Fourteenth Amendment.'1 He argued that regardless of whether one could agree or not with the Court's application
of the fourteenth amendment, corrective action should take place
for the protection of states' rights and representative government.62
The Association's position may be summarized in the following
fashion. First, the reapportionment decisions may or may not have
been proper constitutional interpretations. Second, and related to
the first point, the Court under the Constitution possesses legitimate
authority to review reapportionment cases. But finally, wisdom dictates that the Constitution be amended to grant representation on
some basis other than population. Importantly, the judiciary would
retain its general systemic function while rectifying perceived inimical results stemming from a series of Court decisions.
As can be seen from an inspection of Table 3, the ABA position on the Bricker and reapportionment amendments is consistent
with business and right wing citizen groups and in disagreement
with labor and left wing citizen groups. Obviously, statutory reversal and removal of appellate jurisdiction are not the only methods
to appeal Court decisions. Interest groups placed in a weak position by Court decisions may also utilize the constitutional amendment as an appeal device.
TABLE 2
GROUPS FOR AND AGAINST COURT-CURBING AMENDMENTS,
BRICKER AND DIRKSEN AMENDMENTS
(BRICKER AMENDMENT, S.J. RES. 1)63

For
American Bar Association
American Legion
American Medical Association

Passage
X
X
X

Against
Passage

60. Id.
61. Const. Hearings, supra note 55, at 360.
62. Id. at 358.
63. Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
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Christian Science Committee on Publication
Conference of State Manufacturers Association
Daughters of the American Revolution
Military Order of the World Wars
National Association of Attorneys General
National Association of Manufacturers
National Defense League of America
National Economic Council, Inc.
National Society of New England Women
National Sojourners, Inc.
Southern States Industrial Council
Steuben Society of America
United States Chamber of Commerce
Veterans of Foreign Wars
Wheel of Progress
AFL-CIO
Air Transport Association
American Association for the Advancement
of the United Nations
International Association of Machinists
American Association of University Women
American Civil Liberties Union
Americans for Democratic Action
American Jewish Congress
Association of the Bar of the City of New York
Collegiate Council for United Nations
Friends Committee
General Board of Christian Social Concern,
Methodist Church
National-Defamation League
National Foreign Trade Council
Republican Administration
Students for Democratic Action
United World Federalists
Women's International League for
Peace and Freedom
Young Women's Christian Association of the U.S.A.

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

(DIRKSEN REAPPORTIONMENT AMENDMENT,
American Bar Association
American Farm Bureau Federation
Legislature Representation
Liberty Lobby
National Association of Manufacturers
National Association of Real Estate Boards
National Cotton Council of America
National Council on Farmers Cooperatives
National Farmers Union
National Livestock Feeders Association
National Milk Producers Association

S.J. RES. 2)64

X
X
X
X
X
X

x
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

64. Hearings on S.J. Res. 2 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,

89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
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United States Chamber of Commerce
X
AFL-CIO
Alliance for Social, Economic and Political Progress
American Civil Liberties Union
American Ethical Union
American Jewish Congress
American Veterans Committee
Americans for Democratic Action
International Ladies Garment Workers Union

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

III. CONCLUSIONS
The law plays a special role in the political system. Although
it is sometimes used by interest groups to achieve special ends, the
law is fundamentally a device for system maintenance. What is
believed to be legitimate political argument and dissent is confined
within the boundaries laid down by law. The American Bar Association has taken it upon itself to aid in the boundary defining process.
The Association's ruling elite tends to be populated by the upper strata of the legal profession which generally has been supportive of
the status quo and as such has a special interest in maintaining the
system. The Warren Court, however, placed difficult demands upon
the Association. Many Warren Court decisions were greeted with regret. The Association was faced with the difficult task of reconciling specific disapproval of Court decisions with general institu'tional support.
The ABA has rendered the Court institutional support by its
opposition to proposals which would remove appellate jurisdiction
and by failing to join attempts to diminish its authority. Yet, it
has been willing to recommend various ways to circumvent Court
decisions. The statutory reversal technique appears to be the most
favored device and it tends to possess the added virtue of low public visibility. The constitutional amendment has also been recommended but only as a remedial measure and not in diminution of the
Court's constitutional authority.
The ABA stategy is consistent with both congressional and public attitudes. In the post-War period Congress has supported reversal
attempts more often than direct institutional attacks upon the
Court. It should be noted that the distinction between types of
Court-curbing actions is more meaningful for Northern Democrats
in the House than it is for those Congressmen who commonly comprise the Conservative Coalition. The data for the Senate reveals a
similar pattern.6 5 To the extent that the ABA has limited its Courtcurbing activities to statutory reversals and supported the Court
against institutional attacks, it is consistent with known public atti65.

Schmidhauser, Berg & Melone, supra note 2, at 215.
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tudes. Murphy and Tanenhaus have found that specific support
("the extent to which people praise or criticize particular decisions
and the performance of individual justices") is low among the
United States population and that those who criticize specific decisions of the Court outnumber those who praise its specific decisions. 61 Conversely, diffuse support ("the degree to which people
think a court carries out its overall responsibilities in an impartial
and competent fashion") is relatively high and many people
who are critical of the Court's specific decisions nonetheless support
the institution itself.6 7 Apparently then, the general ABA strategy is
consistent with both elite (congressional) and mass public opinion.
A further finding emerges from the text. Often civil liberty and
constitutional amendment issues involve more than is at first discernible. The ABA's support of H.R. 3, for example, goes beyond
the desire to preserve the state right to punish seditious behavior.
The ABA was also concerned with the implications of the Nelson decision in the field of commerce, labor, banking, and communication.
A nationally-minded Supreme Court which, incidentally, might also
be anti-business, may strike down state legislation in favor of national legislation unfavorable to business interests. Again, the Association's position on both the Bricker and reapportionment amendments may involve more then esoteric constitutional argument. Econmic interests were at stake in both proposals. It might seem that I
have belabored this point. Yet it is important when analyzing ABA
behavior. The agency relationship between the ABA and big business
is the nexus between ideological predispositions and the Association's
Court related behavior. 8 Importantly, the Association was pulled
by its professional responsibility to support the Court. General institutional support was made difficult because: (a) many ABA
leaders did not agree with various Court decisions, and (b) many
Court decisions were detrimental to big business interests. The
Association needed a method to render the Court institutional support while simultaneously upsetting the results of specific decisions
deemed unwise. The method settled upon is the rather sophisticated device of recommending statutory reversals and related tactics without doing severe damage to the Court's authority. Effecting a desirable ideological and vested interest result, the Association has also been able to fulfill its institutional support function.
The ABA and bar groups generally have a unique problem.
Unlike ordinary interest groups it is constrained by a professional
responsibility to support the judicial machinery. Yet lawyers have
66.
67.
68.

Murphy & Tanenhaus, supra note 11, at 371.
Id. at 373-74.
Melone, supra note 11, at 10-12.
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passions, desires and immediate interests to nourish and protect.
The reconciliation of specific disapproval with institutional support teaches us much about the art of system maintenance.

